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“The health and wellbeing of employees makes an essential contribution to 
business success. I believe that employees are at their most productive and 
creative when they are in an environment that supports their health and 
wellbeing.” 
Professor Dame Carol Black, National Director for Health and Work 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2015, Google was named the world’s best company to work for by Fortune 
Magazine and the Great Place to Work Institute for the 6th time since 2007, for its strong 
commitment to providing its employees with a supportive and satisfying workplace. Google’s 
employee-friendly workplace practices are considered crucial to incubating various 
innovative and successful projects. Concurrently, Google is notable for its innovation. 
According to ‘The Most Innovative Companies’ list compiled by the Boston Consulting 
Group, Google was the world’s second most innovative company in 2014 and has placed in 
the top three since 2006. Is this combination of employee-friendly workplace practices and 
innovative success merely a coincidence? We examine whether a firm’s commitment to 
providing a high quality workplace for its employees spurs innovation.  
Innovation is important for encouraging economic growth (Solow, 1957; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1990) and establishing firms’ 
competitive advantages (Porter, 1990, 1992). Relatedly, improving workplace standards has 
become increasingly important to operating in today’s competitive environment because 
firms are under greater pressure to innovate for which talented employees are a key driving 
force (Zingales, 2000). Although studies have examined the influence of employee welfare 
on stock returns (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2014), leverage (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 
2010; Bae et al., 2011) and cash holdings (Ghaly et al., 2015), relatively little attention has 
been paid to whether and how employee-friendly workplaces foster innovation. Investigating 
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this question provides crucial implications for the firm’s workplace practices and policies 
concerning employee relations and for their contribution to the firm’s broader strategy and 
innovation in particular. 
The main challenges for firms in pursuing and managing innovation activities are the 
unpredictability of outcomes and the high probability of failure (Holmstrӧm, 1989). By 
implementing employee-friendly policies, firms are able to increase employee job satisfaction, 
strengthen their relationships with employees, and enhance employee trust in management, 
thereby offsetting the negative influence of high-risk innovative activities on employees. 
Thus, an employee-friendly workplace likely promotes greater tolerance for failure and 
encourages employee engagement in experimentation and innovation.  
Existing research asserts the important role of psychological capital for achieving 
effective job performance (Fredrickson, 2001; Luthans and Jensen, 2002; Luthans et al., 2006; 
Luthans and Youssef, 2007; Youssef and Luthans, 2007).1 These studies argue that a positive, 
employee-friendly workplace helps develop employees who are hopeful, meaning they are 
more capable of finding positive meaning in adversity and creating redeeming value in failure, 
and resilient, being able to recover from failure in ways that strengthen effectiveness. By 
cultivating these psychological strengths of hope and resilience in employees, firms with 
employee-friendly workplaces are likely to be more tolerant of failure and more capable of 
overcoming adversity in pursuing innovation. In addition, satisfied employees are more likely 
to internalize the firm’s innovation objectives, which strengthens their motivation to 
overcome difficulties and failure during the innovation process. Drawing upon recent insights 
that tolerance for failure is a key driver of innovation (Azoulay et al., 2011; Tian and Wang, 
2014), we hypothesize that firms with employee-friendly workplaces invest more heavily in 
innovation and achieve greater innovation success. 
We use the term “workplace quality” to capture how employee-friendly a workplace is. 
We apply two measures of workplace quality. The first is based on the ‘100 Best Companies 
                                                          
1
 Drawn from positive psychology, the concept of ‘psychological capital’ refers to psychological strengths, such 
as hope and resilience, in the context of workplace applications. This differs from human capital, which is 
defined as the experience, education, skills, knowledge, and ideas that people bring to their jobs. However, like 
human capital, psychological capital can be viewed as an asset that can be developed and managed by 
organizations to achieve superior performance in today’s competitive environment. See Luthans et al. (2006). 
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to Work for in America’ list and the second is the employee relations score from the KLD 
database. Research and Development (R&D) expenditures and patent and citation counts 
measure a firm’s innovation investment and productivity, respectively. We find that 
workplace quality is positively associated with R&D expenditures, patents and citations. 
Controlling for R&D expenditures, we show that greater innovation output is not merely the 
result of increased investment in innovation. The findings are robust to alternative 
econometric methods, model specifications, subsamples, and measures of workplace quality. 
More importantly, we apply both propensity score matching and instrumental variables 
methods to address potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, our identification tests results 
suggest that workplace quality has a positive causal effect on firm innovation. 
To investigate whether employee-friendly workplaces nurture innovation by 
strengthening tolerance for failure, we rely on heterogeneity in the effect of workplace quality 
on innovation across firms with different degrees of innovation failure risk (Tian and Wang, 
2014). We expect the impact of workplace quality on innovation to be stronger when failure 
risk is higher and thus tolerance for failure is more needed. Consistent with this view, the 
positive effect of workplace quality on innovation is indeed more prominent in industries in 
which innovation is more difficult to achieve. This finding reveals an important insight into 
the mechanism through which employee-friendly workplaces nurture innovation. 
To provide more direct evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces are 
failure-tolerant, we examine the resilience of firms to the disruptive change in their business 
environment seen in the crisis of 2007-2009. In times of economic distress characterized by 
higher uncertainty (Bloom, 2014) and risk of failure (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009), companies 
may reduce investments in innovation to help ensure firm survival. However, if employee-
friendly workplaces improve the firm’s ability to deal with increased uncertainty and failure 
risk, we would expect such firms to be more likely to sustain R&D investments during the 
recession. Following the insights from recent studies (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Mian et al., 2013; 
Mian and Sufi, 2014), we exploit state differences in the house price collapse to capture the 
cross-sectional variation in the severity of economic distress and investigate the effect of 
workplace quality on the sensitivity of R&D investment to distress. We find that firms with 
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low workplace quality cut R&D investments significantly following house price shocks. 
However, high workplace quality firms maintained their R&D investment, suggesting greater 
failure-tolerance. 
It is important to consider alternative interpretations for the positive relation between 
workplace quality and innovation. First, an employee-friendly workplace may nurture 
innovation by improving the recruitment and retention of talented employees (Huselid, 1995; 
Sheridan, 1992; Turban and Greening, 1996; Edmans, 2012). Under this alternative, the 
positive effect of workplace quality on innovation should be more prominent in firms with 
higher levels of intangible capital embedded in their key employees and in industries with 
higher labor mobility. Our results do not support this hypothesis. Second, employee-friendly 
workplaces may alleviate executives’ career concerns that impede investment in innovation. 
Executives who are committed to providing employees with a quality workplace environment 
may gain allegiance from subordinates and face lower risk of termination after poor 
performance, encouraging their engagement in risky, long-term innovative activities. To test 
this alternative, we investigate executive turnover-performance sensitivity. We do not find 
lower sensitivity for firms with more employee-friendly workplaces. Third, the decisions to 
support innovation activities and implement employee-friendly policies may be influenced by 
the CEO’s incentives, such as compensation. Thus, we include controls for CEO pay-
performance sensitivity (delta) and sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega). We 
find that the positive effect of workplace quality on innovation is robust to these inclusions 
and conclude that differences in CEO incentive contracts do not explain the positive effect of 
workplace quality on innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how our 
research relates to the existing literature. Section 3 explains the sample selection and 
documents summary statistics. Section 4 presents the baseline results and shows that the 
results are robust and not driven by endogeneity. Section 5 provides evidence that employee-
friendly workplaces engender failure tolerance and thus encourage engagement in innovation. 
Section 6 discusses and tests alternative hypotheses, and Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Relation to the existing literature 
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it adds to the debate of whether 
an employee-friendly orientation is beneficial to firms. Traditional theorists, such as Taylor 
(1911), view employees as unskilled labor with no special status, just like other inputs such 
as raw materials. Under this view, employee welfare represents wasteful expenditure since it 
is against management’s goal of maximizing output while minimizing cost. However, the role 
of employees has changed dramatically as technology and the nature of the firm have evolved. 
Modern firms tend to be human capital-intensive organizations that operate in a highly 
competitive environment emphasizing quality and innovation (Zingales, 2000; Edmans, 2011; 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). Concurrently, technology advancements have increased the 
demand for a highly motivated, rapidly evolving workforce in order to keep up-to-date with 
the most in-demand skills. Therefore, by improving the retention, motivation, and 
productivity of employees, the key source of value creation in modern firms, employee-
friendly workplaces can contribute to firm performance. Consistent with this human capital–
centered view, Edmans (2011) and Edmans et al. (2014) find that employee satisfaction is 
associated with positive abnormal stock returns. Our paper contributes to the debate by 
showing that an employee-friendly workplace is associated with greater innovation, which 
benefits shareholders. 
Second, our paper contributes to the recent and growing literature on the relations 
between innovation and various firm characteristics. Firms pursue more influential 
innovation, as measured by patent citations, in the years following private equity investments 
(Lerner et al., 2011). Firms with higher institutional ownership are associated with more 
innovation because higher institutional ownership reduces the manager’s career concern, 
which is an impediment to investment in risky innovative activities (Aghion et al., 2013). 
Becker-Blease (2011) shows that protection against unwanted acquisition attempts is 
beneficial for firm innovation as it shields managers from short-term performance concerns 
and permits a more long-term, value-enhancing investment strategy that stimulates 
innovation. Sapra et al. (2014) develop a theoretical model that predicts a U-shaped relation 
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between innovation and takeover pressure and find empirical support for the predicted 
relation using the staggered passage of state antitakeover laws to capture the variation in the 
threat of takeovers. Fang et al. (2014) find that stock liquidity impedes firm innovation 
because high liquidity leads to increased threats of hostile takeover and a greater presence of 
non-dedicated institutional investors, pressuring managers to boost current profits and reduce 
investment in long-term innovation projects. Tian and Wang (2014) and Chemmanur et al. 
(2014) show that firms backed by more failure-tolerant venture capitalists are significantly 
more innovative than firms backed by less failure-tolerant venture capitalists.2  
These existing studies have focused primarily on firm characteristics in relation to 
external capital markets. Far fewer studies have examined the role of a firm’s internal 
systems for nurturing innovation. Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) find that firms operated 
by overconfident CEOs are associated with larger investments in innovation and greater 
innovation productivity. Manso (2011) shows theoretically that managerial incentive 
contracts that exhibit tolerance for early failure and reward long-term success are best for 
motivating innovation. Our paper contributes to this line of research by showing that 
developing the proper internal systems with good employee relations and a satisfying 
workplace fosters innovation. 
A contemporaneous study that examines the relation between employee treatment and 
innovation is Chen et al. (2014). Our paper differs in several ways. First, we focus on 
uncovering the details of possible mechanisms through which employee-friendly workplaces 
spur firm innovation to shed further light on the effect of workplace quality and, in turn, 
causality (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Second, we consider and address the potential sample 
selection bias due to missing values on the employee relations score, which confirms the 
validity of our conclusions. Finally, our sample period encompasses the recent crisis of 2007-
                                                          
2
 Other notable studies examine the relations between innovation and market characteristics, as opposed to firm 
characteristics, including product market competition (Aghion et al., 2005), labor laws (Acharya et al., 2013), 
bankruptcy laws (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009), financial market development (Hsu et al., 2014), and 
general market conditions (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). 
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2009,3 which allows us to elaborate on the failure tolerance mechanism by examining the 
resilience of firms to disruptive changes. 
Our study is also related to Flammer and Kacperczyk (2015), who find that CSR has a 
positive impact on innovation. However, CSR comprises numerous dimensions. While some 
dimensions may be beneficial for innovation, it is unclear whether others are of similar 
benefit. Combining several dimensions may give an incomplete understanding of how 
innovation is fostered within firms. Therefore, this paper’s focus is on workplace quality, 
which represents a specific dimension of CSR in relation to employee relations that has an 
intuitive and anecdotal link to innovation. We find that greater employee welfare is beneficial 
to innovation. The results are consistent with the view that an employee-friendly workplace 
stimulates innovation by promoting psychological capital in the form of hope and resilience 
via tolerance for failure.  
 
3. Sample selection, empirical specification and summary statistics 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our patent and citation data are collected from three sources. We start with the latest 
version of the NBER Patent Citation database, which provides information for all utility 
patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) over the period of 1976-
2006. We then supplement this information to include the period 2007-2010 that is provided 
by Kogan et al. (2012).4 Finally, we obtain the technological class of the patents from the 
Harvard Business School (HBS) patent and inventor database.5 To measure a firm’s overall 
workplace quality, we use the ‘100 Best Companies to Work for in America’ list compiled by 
the Great Place to Work Institute, as well as the employee relations score from the KLD 
database. 6  To construct control variables, we obtain board of director information from 
Riskmetrics and firms’ accounting information from Compustat. All accounting variables are 
                                                          
3 Our sample consists of 8,911 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2010, while their sample covers 4,453 firm-
years from 1992 to 2006. 
4
 This dataset provided by Kogan et al. (2012) is available at https://iu.box.com/patents. 
5
 The HBS patent and inventor database is available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent.  
6 The Best Companies list has been published in Fortune magazine annually since 1997. Therefore, our sample 
of the list also begins in 1997. 
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winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the potential impact of outliers. Our 
sample includes firms that are at the intersection of these databases, comprising 1,500 firms 
yielding 8,911 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2010.7 Firm-year observations with 
missing data on the employee relations variable or any other controls are deleted. Financial 
firms are excluded.  
 
3.2. Empirical specification 
To examine whether workplace quality affects firm innovation, we estimate the 
following baseline empirical specification: 
ln(Innovation i, t+1) =  +  × Workplace quality i, t 
                                                      +  Z i, t + Industry i + Year t +  i, t                        (1) 
The measures of Innovation and Workplace quality are discussed in detail below. Z is a 
vector of firm characteristics that affect a firm’s innovation activities based on the extant 
literature. Industry represents industry fixed effects defined based on two-digit SIC codes and 
Year captures year fixed effects. 
 
3.2.1. Measuring innovation 
We use both input- and output-oriented measures of firm innovation. The resources 
devoted to innovation activities are measured by the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures. 
Firm-years with missing R&D information are assigned a zero value.8 Innovation output is 
measured by patents and citations, which capture how effectively a firm has utilized its 
innovation inputs. Our first measure of innovation output is the number of patent applications 
filed in a year that are eventually granted.9  Simple patent counts may be insufficient to 
                                                          
7 Independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable to mitigate the endogeneity 
concern. Hence, our sample of one-year-ahead patents and citations begins in 1998 coinciding with the 
availability of the Best Companies list in 1997. We do not restrict our sample to firms with patents for 
consistency with prior literature. 
8 To avoid losing firm-year observations with no R&D expenditures in the logarithmic transformation, we add 
one to the actual value before calculating the natural logarithm. This adjustment is also applied when calculating 
the natural logarithms of patent count and citations. 
9 When constructing this measure, we use a patent’s application year rather than the grant year because the 
application year provides a better indicator of the actual timing of innovation (Griliches et al., 1988). 
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capture innovation productivity, as patents vary considerably in their technological and 
economic significance. Therefore, we also use the citation count to measure patent quality. 
For each firm, the citation-based measure is constructed as the total number of non-self 
citations ultimately received by the patents applied for in a given year.  
The NBER patent database has several imperfections. First, it takes time for a patent 
application to be granted; hence, there is a truncation bias in the number of patents towards 
the end of the sample period. Second, patents granted near the end of the period tend to have 
fewer citations because they have less time to accumulate them. We include year fixed effects 
in our regressions to address potential time truncation issues. Industry fixed effects are also 
included to account for variation in patenting and citation intensities across industries (Hall et 
al., 2001; Seru, 2014).  
To address these truncation issues further, we follow Hall et al. (2001) and Seru (2014) 
and adjust both patents and citations. The variable Patent divides the number of patents for 
each firm by the average patent count of all firms in the same technology class (i.e., a finer 
industry classification used by the USPTO to assign patents) and year. For citations, each 
patent’s non-self citation count is scaled by its mean across all patents in the same technology 
class and year. The variable Citation is then the sum of these adjusted citation counts across 
all patents applied for by a firm in a given year. Since the distribution of patent counts 
(citations) in the sample is right-skewed we use the natural logarithm of one plus Patent 
(Citation) in the regressions. 
 
3.2.2. Measuring workplace quality 
Our first measure of workplace quality is the list of the ‘100 Best Companies to Work 
for in America’ (denoted, BC), also used by Edmans (2011, 2012), Edmans et al. (2014) and 
Ghaly et al. (2015). It is regarded as a thorough measure of workplace quality and is arguably 
the most respectable and prominent measure available (Edmans, 2011, 2012).10 However, the 
                                                          
10 A firm’s ranking on the Best Companies list depends on two sources. Two-thirds of the score is based on 
employee responses to a 57-question survey that covers topics such as attitudes toward management, job 
satisfaction, fairness, and camaraderie. According to the institute, a great place to work is one in which 
“employees trust the people they work for, have pride in what they do, and enjoy the people they work with.” 
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Best Companies list is not free from limitations. For instance, by publicizing only the top 100 
firms, it includes only firms in the right tail of workplace quality, which affects the 
generalizability of results to the wider distribution. 11  In addition, the list incorporates 
employee perceptions of workplace quality, which fuels reverse causality concerns. 
Employees may be happier working for an innovative firm that provides them with 
opportunities to work on fashionable and exciting products.  
To mitigate the above concerns, we also measure workplace quality using the employee 
relations score from the KLD database (denoted, ER), which has been applied extensively in 
the CSR literature (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010; Bae et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2013; 
Ghaly et al., 2015). Following Bae et al. (2011), ER is constructed using five strength 
categories of employee relations: union relations, cash profit-sharing, employee involvement, 
retirement benefits, and health and safety. KLD assigns a binary rating for each category for 
each firm. ER is the sum of the ratings across the five categories with a higher value 
indicating a more employee-friendly workplace. 
There are two important advantages to the employee relations score. The KLD database 
has covered approximately 650 companies since 1991 and more than 3000 firms since 2003. 
The considerably wider coverage than the Best Companies list addresses concerns about 
generalizability. Second, ER derives from KLD’s evaluation of each firm’s employee-related 
practices and policies, independent from employees’ perceptions. This implies reverse 
causality is less likely since firms do not base their employee relations practices directly on 
patent and citation counts. Hence, we use the employee relations score as our primary 
measure of workplace quality. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The remaining one-third of the score depends on the institute’s evaluation of factors such as a company’s 
demographic makeup, pay and benefits program, and culture. 
11Relatedly, the Great Place to Work Institute does not survey all companies. Firms must apply to be 
considered for the list, and approximately 400 firms do so each year, raising concerns about potential selection 
bias. However, such selection issues either have no effect or bias the results downward. See Edmans (2011) for 
a more detailed explanation. 
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Following the extant literature (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Aghion et al., 2013; Tian and 
Wang, 2014), we control for firm characteristics that may affect future innovation 
productivity. In the baseline regressions, the control variables include firm size measured as 
the natural logarithm of firm market capitalization (Ln(MV)); growth opportunities measured 
as Tobin’s Q (Q); Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Lev); capital 
intensity measured as net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets (PPE/TA); 
profitability measured as the return on assets (ROA); and investment in innovation measured 
as R&D expenditures scaled by total assets (R&D/TA). To account for the potential impact of 
corporate governance on the level of innovative activity (O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012; Sapra 
et al., 2014), we include the fraction of independent directors on the board (Board 
independence) as well as the entrenchment index (E index) compiled by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our variables. An average firm generates 
approximately 2 patents and 14 non-self citations per year and has a market capitalization of 
9,369 million US dollars, Tobin’s Q of 2.0, leverage of 22.0%, PPE-to-assets ratio of 29.9%, 
return on assets of 14.8%, fraction of independent directors of 72.0%, E index value of 2.8, 
and R&D-to-assets ratio of 2.8%. Approximately 4.0 % of the firm-year observations are 
included on the Best Companies list. An average firm has an employee relations score of 0.5, 
with a maximum (minimum) of 5 (0). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
In Table 2, we compare means and medians across subsamples of firms with high and 
low levels of workplace quality. In panel A, firms are divided into high and low ER samples 
according to the sample median, which is zero. Consistent with our conjecture, firms with 
employee-friendly policies have higher patents and citations on average. A firm in the high 
ER group has, on average, approximately five times as many patents and citations, which are 
statistically significant differences. Panel B separates firms according to the most recent Best 
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Companies list. On average, a firm making the Best Companies list has approximately six 
times as many patents and seven times as many citations. With respect to the control 
variables, firms with employee-friendly workplaces are larger and show better performance 
in terms of Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
4. Workplace quality and innovation activity 
4.1. Baseline results 
Table 3 shows the relation between workplace quality and firm innovation, as measured 
by R&D expenditures (Panel A), patents (Panel B) and citations (Panel C). The table shows 
estimators using a range of methods: excluding and including controls, Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, and between estimators.12  When analyzing patents and citations, we include 
R&D expenditures as an additional control to examine whether workplace quality increases 
innovation output for a given level of investment input. Across all regressions, the 
coefficients on ER are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better, providing 
strong and consistent evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces invest more in 
innovation and generate more patents and citations, regardless of how workplace quality is 
measured.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
In terms of economic significance, the coefficients on ER in column (2) indicate that a 
one standard deviation increase in ER is associated with 30.0% higher R&D expenditures, 6.9% 
more patents, and 7.1% more citations, other variables constant. The coefficients on BC in 
column (6) suggest that firms on the Best Companies list have 69.5% higher R&D 
expenditures, 37.7% more patents and 47.8% more citations. 
 
                                                          
12
 We estimate using Fama-MacBeth and between estimators methods to make best use of the cross-sectional 
variation in the employee relations score on firm innovation. Variation in innovation is largely driven by cross-
sectional variation in the employee relations score. The lack of within-firm time series variation works against 
finding a significant effect of the employee relations score on innovation in firm fixed effects regressions, which 
mainly estimate the effect of time series variation in the employee relations score within a firm on innovation 
(Zhou, 2001).  
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4.2. Robustness tests 
We take six steps to ensure the robustness of our baseline results.13  First, we test 
whether the results are robust to the use of alternative econometric methods. We use a Tobit 
model to account for the nonnegative nature of our dependent variables and also run Poisson 
regressions that allow for the discrete nature of patent and citation counts. The results hold in 
all tests. Second, we end our sample period in 2008 to adjust the sample in case patent and 
citation data for the final two years may be incomplete. The results are unaffected. Third, we 
construct an alternative employee relations score by incorporating KLD’s concern indicators. 
Following Ghaly et al. (2015), we sum the KLD ratings for the five strength categories and 
subtract those for the five concern categories, creating a ‘net’ employee relations score. The 
results are robust to this alternative measure of workplace quality.  
Fourth, we control for additional CEO and board characteristics. Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) show that CEO overconfidence is an important 
determinant of firm innovation. Following the rationale provided by Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) and the methodology of Campbell et al. (2011), we use the Holder 67 variable as an 
indicator of CEO overconfidence.14 Chen et al. (2015) show that firms with more gender-
diverse boards achieve greater innovative success. We therefore also include Fraction of 
female directors to capture board gender diversity. To mitigate the possibility that further 
CEO and board characteristics may be driving our results, we control for CEO age, CEO 
tenure, CEO gender, Board tenure diversity, and Board age diversity.15 Our results are robust 
to the inclusion of all of these controls.  
The use of an extensive set of controls mitigates omitted variable bias. However, some 
variables such as Tobin’s Q, Leverage and ROA, may be determined jointly with innovation 
                                                          
13
 The results are not reported for brevity, but are available from the author on request. 
14 Holder 67 identifies a CEO as overconfident if he or she postpones the exercise of company stock options that 
are at least 67 percent in the money. Following Campbell et al. (2011), we estimate the average CEO stock 
option moneyness for each year using the Execucomp data as follows. We first calculate the average realizable 
value per option by dividing the total realizable value of the exercisable options by the number of exercisable 
options. Next, we subtract the average realizable value from the fiscal year-end stock price to obtain the average 
exercise price of the options. The estimated moneyness of the options is then calculated as the stock price 
divided by the estimated average exercise price minus one. As we are interested in the CEO’s decisions to hold 
options that could have been exercised, we include only exercisable options held by the CEO. 
15 Fraction of foreign directors is defined as the ratio of the number of non-US directors to board size. Age 
(Tenure) diversity is calculated as the standard deviation of director age (tenure) divided by the average age 
(tenure) of directors on the board. 
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activities, thereby biasing our results. Therefore, in Table 3 we also report parsimonious 
specifications that include only workplace quality, and industry and year effects. Our fifth 
robustness test replaces all firm-level controls with industry-level controls (computed as 
industry averages), or alternatively with industry-year effects. These are arguably less 
contaminated by endogenetity concerns and we find that our results remain positive and 
significant. 
Finally, we test whether the results are robust to alternative clustering and definitions of 
industry dummies. Regressions in Table 3 include two-digit SIC industry and year dummies 
and standard errors are clustered by firm. We confirm that our findings are robust to Fama-
French 49 industry classification dummies, three-digit NAICS industry dummies, the 
exclusion of year dummies, clustering by industry and year, and double clustering by industry 
and year, and firm and year. 
 
4.3. Do missing data on the employee relations score affect the results? 
Data on the employee relations score are missing for a number of firms in the KLD 
database. This may create a potential sample selection bias if firms that do not have employee 
relations data also generate high or low innovation.16 We address this concern in three ways. 
We compare the industry distribution of the deleted sample due to missing information with 
those of the initial and final samples. We find scant difference in the industry distributions 
across the three samples, implying no evidence that firms in certain industries are more likely 
to be deleted than others. Second, we adopt a multiple imputation approach that replaces each 
missing value with a set of imputed values17, estimates the innovation regressions for each of 
the imputed datasets, and combines the results following Rubin (1987) for inference. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported. 
We also adopt a Heckman (1979) two-step analysis to control for the potential sample 
selection bias in regressions. In the first step, we estimate a probit model where the dependent 
                                                          
16
 We are grateful to the referee for drawing our attention to this possible bias and suggesting possible 
robustness tests. 
17
 Following Yuan (2011), we impute missing values based on the regression of the employee relations score on 
the other controls, industry, and year effects, as well as a simulated normal deviate. See Yuan (2011) for more 
details about the multiple imputation procedure. 
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variable is one if the data on the employee relations score are available and zero if they are 
missing. The independent variables include the identifying variable, Post KLD coverage 
expansion, in addition to the original control variables in innovation regressions. Post KLD 
coverage expansion is a dummy that equals one for the period after KLD expanding its 
coverage in 2003 and zero otherwise. This expansion represents a noticeable jump in the 
likelihood of non-missing employee relation scores that is plausibly exogenous to firm 
innovation.18  In the second step, we re-estimate the effect of workplace quality on firm 
innovation, after including the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) derived from the first-step probit 
regression as an additional independent variable. The results suggest that the coefficients on 
Post KLD coverage expansion in probit regressions are positive and significant, consistent 
with our prediction. More importantly, the impact of ER on firm innovation remains positive 
and significant after we control for Lambda in the second-step regressions, confirming that 
potential sample-selection bias does not drive our results. 
 
4.4. Does endogeneity drive the results? 
Our estimates may be biased due to the endogeneity problems which could occur when 
certain characteristics not captured by the model are correlated with both a firm’s innovation 
output and its workplace practices (unobserved heterogeneity), or when profitable, innovative 
firms are more likely to invest in employee-friendly workplaces (reverse causality). To 
address these potential concerns, we employ two approaches: propensity score matching to 
address the matching concern based on observable firm characteristics and instrumental 
variables regressions to address reverse causality.  
We use propensity score matching to compare firms that have employee-friendly 
workplaces (treatment group) with otherwise indistinguishable firms that do not have 
employee-friendly workplaces (control group). An employee-friendly workplace is defined as 
either a firm with an employee relations score above the sample median or a firm that is on 
the Best Companies list. We construct the control group using the nearest-neighbor method 
                                                          
18 In 2003 KLD expanded its coverage universe to include more than 3000 US companies from previously 
approximately 1000 companies. 
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with propensity scores derived from a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one for firms with employee-friendly workplaces according to 
the definitions above. The explanatory variables include the same firm characteristics 
included in the previous tables as well as industry and year effects. To ensure that firms in the 
treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar, we require that the maximum difference 
between the propensity score of a treatment firm and its matched control firm does not 
exceed 0.001 in absolute value. Untabulated results show that the average treatment effect 
(ATT) estimates are consistent with those reported. Specifically, firms with ER values above 
the median produce 14.4% more patents and 14.8% more citations. Firms on the Best 
Companies list generate 22.1% more patents and 21.1% more citations. 
We employ the instrumental variables approach to extract the exogenous component of 
workplace quality and use it to explain innovation outcomes. We use two instrumental 
variables to capture the exogenous variation in a firm’s tendency to provide employee-
friendly workplaces. Having two instrumental variables for one endogenous regressor allows 
us to conduct an overidentification test of whether the instruments satisfy the exclusion 
restriction. Our first instrument, Implied Contract (IC), is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm is headquartered in a state that has the implied-contract exception and zero 
otherwise.19 The second instrument, ln(UI benefits), is the natural logarithm of state-level 
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.20 On the one hand, the staggered adoption of the 
implied-contract exception and UI benefits across states provide plausibly exogenous 
variation that is positively related to employee treatment, as argued by Acharya et al. (2013) 
and Flammer and Luo (2016). On the other, both instruments are expected to be uncorrelated 
with firm innovation, except through their impact on employee treatment. To verify this 
condition, we add the instruments to the OLS regressions of innovation both separately and 
together and find that they are not significant. 
                                                          
19
 The implied-contract exception is a wrongful discharge law that implicitly prohibits employers from 
terminating employment contracts without just cause. 
20
 The data on state-level UI benefits are collected from the U.S. Department of Labor’s ‘Significant Provisions 
of State UI Laws’. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013) and Flammer and Luo (2016), we measure the 
generosity of a state’s UI benefits as the product of the maximum benefit amount and the maximum duration 
allowed. 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 present the results of the first-stage regression where 
the dependent variable is ER. Consistent with our predictions for the instruments, their 
coefficient estimates are positive and significant at the 10% level or better. In addition, we 
conduct three tests to verify their validity. We first test the joint significance of the two 
instruments and find that the values of the F-test are large and highly significant (p-
value=0.000). Second, the p-values of the Cragg-Donald’s Wald F weak-instrument test 
statistic are very close to zero, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak 
(Cragg and Donald, 1993; Stock and Yogo, 2005). Third, the p-values for Hansen’s J over-
identification test are large (0.153 or higher), suggesting that the two instruments are valid 
(Hansen, 1982). More importantly, in the second-stage analysis (columns (2), (4), and (5)), 
we find that ER continues to be a positive and significant determinant of innovation after 
accounting for the potential endogeneity of firm innovativeness, confirming our prior results 
in Table 3.  
 
5.  Workplace quality and tolerance for failure 
5.1. Failure risk of innovation and the workplace quality effect 
To investigate whether the positive effect of workplace quality on innovation is due to 
improved tolerance for failure, we follow the method of Tian and Wang (2014) to explore the 
variation in firms’ failure risk of innovation. If employee-friendly environments affect 
employees’ attitude towards failure and fosters innovation we expect the marginal effect of 
workplace quality on innovation to be stronger when the failure risk of innovation is higher 
so that failure tolerance is much more needed and valued.  
We classify our patent sample into three categories: 1) pharmaceutical, medical 
instrumentation, healthcare, and chemicals (hereafter pharmaceutical); 2) computers, 
communications, electrical and business equipment, software programing, and internet 
applications (hereafter computers and software); and 3) other miscellaneous patents (hereafter 
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low-tech).21 The rationale is that patents vary in their level of difficulty and reward (Hall et al. 
2005). According to Tian and Wang (2014), patents for new pharmaceutical drugs are the 
most difficult to generate, followed by patents for new software programs. Low-tech patents 
are the least difficult to produce. The development process for a new pharmaceutical drug 
involves multiple steps and countless costly experiments, whereas the time and resources 
required for developing a new software program is lower and the probability of success may 
be higher (Tian and Wang, 2014). Thus, under our failure tolerance view, we expect the 
positive effect of workplace quality to be more prominent in industries that produce new 
pharmaceutical drugs, followed by computers and software, and be least prominent or even 
insignificant for low-tech industries. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
We estimate patent and citation regressions for each industry category separately and 
report our results in Table 5. Due to the limited coverage of the Best Companies list, we rely 
on the employee relations score for the subsample analysis in this and subsequent tables. For 
brevity, we report only the coefficients on ER in Table 5, although we control for other firm 
characteristics. There is a monotonic decrease in the impact of workplace quality on 
innovation as one moves from the high (pharmaceutical) to low (low-tech) innovation failure 
risk categories. These results suggest that an employee-friendly workplace is much more 
important for firms in the pharmaceuticals industry than for those in the software and low-
tech industries, consistent with our failure tolerance view. 
 
5.2. Are firms with employee-friendly workplaces more failure-tolerant? Evidence from the 
change in R&D expenditures during the recent crisis  
To gain further insight into the impact of workplace quality on innovation, we 
investigate how firms with employee-friendly workplaces reacted to the recent economic and 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 by exploring the change in their R&D expenditures. Higher 
uncertainty (Bloom, 2014) and inflated risk of failure (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009) that 
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 If a firm has no patents, we classify it into one of the above categories based on the type of patents that are 
most frequently produced in the firm’s industry following Tian and Wang (2014). 
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characterize economic crises raise significant challenges that may impair firms’ ability to 
undertake risky investments in innovation. As a result, companies may delay or cut R&D 
projects to ensure firm survival. If employee-friendly workplaces help companies gain 
superior trust from their employees, which improves firms’ ability to deal with increased 
uncertainty and failure risk, then we would expect that such firms are more likely to sustain 
their R&D investments during the recession. 
Recent studies suggest that regions that suffered larger drops in house prices were more 
severely affected by the crisis, resulting in a larger drop in consumption and employment 
(Mian and Sufi, 2011; Mian et al., 2013; Mian and Sufi, 2014). Accordingly, we exploit state 
differences in the house price collapse to capture the cross-sectional variation in the severity 
of the recession. 22  We are particularly interested in the interactive effect of whether 
workplace quality attenuates the effect of the severity of the recession on the change in R&D 
expenditures, which is less likely to be affected by omitted factors. Specifically, we estimate 
the following regression:  
∆Ln(1+R&D) i, s =  +  ER i, s+  House price shock s + House price shock s × ER i, s  
                            +  Z i, s + Industry i, s +  i, s                                                            (2) 
where i indexes firms, s indexes states. ∆Ln(1+R&D) is the change in R&D expenditures 
from 2007-2009. House price shock is the percentage drop in the Zillow Home Value Index 
(ZHVI)23  from December 2006 until December 2009 in the company’s state. ER is the 
employee relations score from the KLD database. As in previous regressions, we control for 
the same set of firm characteristics, all measured in 2007. Our timings are consistent with 
recent studies of the recession (Mian and Sufi, 2014; Flammer and Ioannou, 2015). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
We estimate equation (2) and report the results in column (3) of Table 6. The 
coefficient on the interaction term (House price shock × ER) is positive, weakening the 
                                                          
22
 This approach is analogous to a difference-in-differences analysis in which we compare R&D investments of 
firms in more affected regions (‘treatment group’) with those of firms in less affected regions (‘control group’). 
23
 Zillow provides estimates of the price of more than 110 million individual houses in the US, based on 
information from several sources, including prior sales, county records, tax assessments, real estate listings, and 
mortgage information. These house-level valuations are aggregated into the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI). 
We find that, on average, the ZHVI dropped by 10.8% from December 2006 until December 2009. 
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negative impact of House price shock on the change in R&D expenditures. Moreover, in 
columns (1) and (2), we classify firms into high and low groups based on the sample median 
of ER and find that a large drop in house price significantly reduces R&D expenditures only 
for low-ER firms. Therefore, both the subsample analysis and the interaction term approach 
suggest that firms with employee-friendly workplaces are more inclined to sustain R&D 
investments following house price shocks, consistent with such firms being more failure-
tolerant. 
 
6. Alternative hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss alternatives to the tolerance for failure hypothesis, which 
could explain why firms with higher workplace quality are associated with substantially 
greater patents and citations.  
 
6.1. Retention and recruitment  
One prominent alternative is that employee-friendly policies enhance a firm’s ability to 
retain and recruit talented employees, the key source of innovation and value creation in 
modern corporations. By catering to the interests of employees, firms are likely to improve 
employee job satisfaction, foster employee commitment to organizational values, and ensure 
that talented employees remain with the firm (Huselid, 1995; Sheridan, 1992; Edmans, 2012). 
An employee-friendly orientation can also serve as a valuable recruitment tool to attract a 
higher quality workforce (Turban and Greening, 1996; Edmans, 2012). 
Under this explanation, workplace quality captures a firm’s ability to retain and attract 
talented employees. If an employee-friendly orientation fosters innovation by improving 
retention and recruitment, then we expect the effect of workplace quality to be stronger in 
firms with higher levels of intangible capital embedded in their key employees (i.e., 
organization capital) and in industries with greater labor mobility. When there is more 
investment in key employees or more labor market flexibility, retaining and recruiting 
talented employees become more important to a firm’s survival and success. To test this 
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hypothesis, we divide the sample according to the firm’s organization capital and industry-
specific labor mobility. 
 
6.1.1. Organization capital  
Organization capital (OC) is a type of intangible capital that is embedded in a firm’s 
key employees (Prescott and Visscher, 1980; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). Firms with 
high levels of organization capital invest heavily in hiring and training key employees. 
However, such key talent can move across firms. If workplace quality nurtures innovation by 
strengthening the retention of key talent, we should expect the retention benefits of an 
employee-friendly orientation to be more pronounced in high OC firms. Therefore, we re-
estimate the regressions for patents and citations for firms grouped according to their levels 
of organization capital divide at the sample median. Following the extant literature (Lev and 
Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev et al., 2009; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013), we measure a 
firm’s organization capital using capitalized selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses scaled by total assets.24  
 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show a positive relation between ER and the number 
of patents in both the high- and low-OC groups. We find a similar pattern for citations in 
columns (4) and (5). We also interact ER with OC in columns (3) and (6) and the coefficients 
on the interaction terms (OC × ER) are both insignificant, supporting the results of the 
subsample analysis. The retention explanation requires a more pronounced effect in high-OC 
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 To estimate a firm’s level of organization capital, we first capitalize SG&A expenditures using the perpetual 
inventory method and then scale this value by total assets. SG&A expenses include expenses primarily aimed at 
improving a firm’s body of knowledge and business processes, such as IT investment; consulting, advertising 
and marketing expenses; and employee training costs. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) cross-validate this 
measure of organization capital by showing that high-OC firms have higher managerial quality, spend more on 
IT, and are more likely to list ‘loss of key personnel’ as a risk factor in their 10-K filings. 
Using the perpetual inventory method, we compute a firm’s stock of organization capital by recursively 
cumulating the deflated value of SG&A expenditures: 
OC’i,t = (1 – δO) × OC’i,t-1 + (SG&Ai,t / cpit),                                                    (2) 
where δO is the depreciation rate, and cpit is the US consumer price index. To implement the law of motion in 
equation (2), we choose an initial stock and depreciation rate. The initial stock of organization capital is defined:  
OC’0 = ��&� ೔ሺ� + ��ሻ, 
where the average real growth rate of firm-level SG&A expenditures g is set to 10% following Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013). In addition, we use a depreciation rate of 15%, which is equal to the depreciation rate used 
by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in its estimation of R&D capital in 2006. Our results are robust 
to depreciation rates between 10% and 50%. Finally, we scale OC’ by total assets to obtain OC, and we use the 
sample median of the scaled variable to split the sample into high- and low-OC firms. 
24 
 
firms. We find no such evidence and there is no indication that an employee-friendly 
workplace fosters innovation by improving the retention of key talent. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
6.1.2. Labor mobility 
If an employee-friendly workplace is conducive to innovation through the improved 
retention and recruitment of key talent, then a natural implication is that the benefits should 
be particularly important in industries where the labor supply is more mobile and so 
employees have more flexibility to leave a firm. Following Donangelo (2014), we measure 
industry-specific labor mobility (LM) as the average occupation dispersion of employed 
workers in an industry. 25  The rationale is that labor mobility is driven by the level of 
occupation-specific human capital. Workers in occupations that are concentrated in a few 
industries are associated with low LM, while workers in occupations that are dispersed across 
the economy are associated with high LM. 
Table 8 presents the results of regressions for groups of firms depending on their 
industry-specific labor mobility. Firms are classified into high- and low-LM groups according 
to the sample median. We find that a more employee-friendly workplace is associated with 
greater innovation in both the high- and low-LM groups, independent of which innovation 
measure we use. Interacting ER with LM in columns (3) and (6) yields insignificant 
interaction terms (LM × ER), confirming that there is no significant difference in the impact 
of ER on innovation between firms with different levels of industry-specific labor mobility. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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 Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the measure of labor mobility is constructed by Donangelo 
(2014) in two stages, first at the occupation level and then at the industry level. In the first stage, the 
concentration of workers in occupation j is estimated by: 
CONCj,t =( ���೔,ೕ,�∑ ���೔,ೕ,�೔ )ଶ, 
where empi,j,t is the number of workers assigned to occupation j who are employed in industry i at time t. In the 
second stage, the aggregate occupation-level concentration measure CONC is computed by industry and 
weighted by the wage expense associated with each occupation: ܮܯ௜,� = ቆ∑ �ܱܰ�௝,� × ���௜,௝,� × ����௜,௝,�∑ ���௜,௝,�����௜,௝,�௝௝ ቇ−ଵ, 
where wagei,j,t is a measure of the average annual wage paid to workers in industry i that are assigned to 
occupation j in year t. Finally, the estimated LM in the above equation is standardized. 
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Overall, the positive effect of ER is pervasive across firms with different levels of 
organization capital and industry-specific labor mobility. This contradicts the argument that 
workplace quality and innovation are related via improved retention and recruitment of key 
employees. This alternative requires more prominent positive effects for firms with high OC 
or high LM, which we do not observe.  
 
6.2. Risk of termination  
A second explanation relates to executives’ career concerns. Executives who are 
committed to employee well-being may gain allegiance from subordinates and face lower risk 
of termination after poor performance. Employee-friendly workplaces may therefore alleviate 
executives’ career concerns that impede investment in innovation, and in so doing, encourage 
their engagement in risky long-term innovative activities. To test this alternative, we 
investigate executive turnover-performance sensitivity. Table 9 presents the results of probit 
regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if there is a 
CEO turnover in a given firm-year.26 The main coefficients of interest are on the interaction 
terms between past firm performance and the employee relations score. We measure 
performance using both accounting performance (ROA and Industry-adjusted ROA 27 ) in 
columns (1) and (2) and stock market performance (Stock return and Abnormal stock return) 
in columns (3) and (4). Consistent with the extant literature, we find that the coefficients on 
the performance variables are negative and highly significant across all specifications, 
suggesting that firms with poor performance are more likely to replace their executives. 
However, we find no difference in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior firm performance 
for firms with different levels of employee welfare. The interaction term between ER and the 
performance variable is not statistically significant in any specification. Thus, we find no 
                                                          
26
 We do not distinguish between forced and voluntary turnover in this paper, and the reasons are twofold. First, 
Kaplan and Minton (2012) state that forced and voluntary turnover cases exhibit similar patterns. Some 
seemingly voluntary turnover cases are actually not voluntary. Second, Jenter and Lewellen (2010) note that the 
existing algorithms used to classify forced and voluntary turnover cases will inevitably cause misclassification 
of some turnover cases, resulting in a downward bias in the estimated turnover-performance sensitivity. 
Therefore, they argue that researchers should treat all turnover cases as potentially forced. Further, Gao et al. 
(2014) show that the results are similar when using forced and voluntary turnover samples.  
27
 Industry-adjusted ROA is calculated as a firm’s ROA minus the average ROA of all firms in the same two-
digit SIC industry. 
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evidence to suggest that an executive in an employee-friendly workplace faces any lower risk 
of termination after poor performance, which contradicts the view that workplace quality 
influences innovation by alleviating executives’ career concerns. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
6.3. CEO compensation and incentives 
We investigate firms’ decisions to support innovation activities and implement 
employee-friendly policies. It is likely that both decisions are affected by CEO incentives, 
such as compensation, causing an omitted variable concern. Table 10 shows the results of 
regressions that control for CEO Delta (ln(1+CEO Delta)), and Vega (ln(1+CEO Vega)), 
which we construct following Hirshleifer et al. (2012). The coefficients on ER and BC remain 
positive and statistically significant across all regressions, suggesting that differences in CEO 
incentive contracts do not explain the positive effect of workplace quality on innovation. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
7. Conclusion 
Using both the Best Companies list and the employee relations score based on the KLD 
database, we find that firms that implement employee-friendly policies and foster satisfying 
workplaces invest more in innovation and achieve greater innovative success, as measured by 
both patent and citation counts for given R&D expenditures. These findings are robust to 
alternative econometric methods, model specifications, subsamples, definitions of workplace 
quality and addressing endogeneity concerns. Consistent with the view that employee-
friendly workplaces engender failure tolerance and thus encourage engagement in 
experimentation and innovation, we find that the positive effect of workplace quality on 
innovation is more prominent in industries with higher innovation failure risk. We also 
provide evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces are more resilient to shocks, 
confirming their relative tolerance for failure. Considering alternative explanations, we find 
no indication that an employee-friendly workplace fosters innovation by improving the 
retention and recruitment of key talent, alleviating executives’ career concerns or that the 
relationship is influenced by CEO incentives.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of main variables. ln(1+R&D) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s 
R&D expenditures. ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents (Patent) 
filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of non-self citations (Citation) received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. 
ER is the employee relations score constructed based on the KLD database. BC is a dummy for whether the firm 
is in the most recent list of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm 
of market capitalization. Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by 
total assets. Lev is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence 
is the number of independent directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009).  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
Innovation measures 
ln(1+R&D) 8,911 2.252 2.496 0.000 1.253 8.260 
ln(1+Patent) 8,911 0.392 0.851 0.000 0.000 3.951 
ln(1+Citation) 8,911 0.668 1.423 0.000 0.000 6.077 
Patent 8,911 1.998 7.114 0.000 0.000 50.994 
Citation 8,911 13.780 57.335 0.000 0.000 434.503 
       
Workplace quality measures 
ER 8,911 0.450 0.760 0.000 0.000 5.000 
BC 8,911 0.040 0.195 0.000 0.000 1.000 
       
Main controls 
ln(MV) 8,911 7.916 1.481 4.936 7.780 11.964 
MV (million $) 8,911 9,369 22,411 139 2,392 157,047 
Q 8,911 1.992 1.219 0.783 1.586 7.416 
Lev 8,911 0.220 0.164 0.000 0.219 0.666 
PPE/TA 8,911 0.299 0.224 0.014 0.236 0.881 
ROA 8,911 0.148 0.082 -0.086 0.139 0.406 
Board independence 8,911 0.720 0.150 0.000 0.750 1.000 
E index 8,911 2.779 1.309 0.000 3.000 6.000 
R&D/TA 8,911 0.028 0.046 0.000 0.002 0.211 
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Table 2  
Univariate analysis 
 
This table presents summary statistics for subsamples of firms with different levels of workplace quality. In 
panel A, firms are divided into high and low employee relations groups according to the sample median of the 
employee relations score (ER), which is zero. In panel B, firms are divided into two groups based on whether 
the firm is in the most recent Best Companies list. ln(1+R&D) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D 
expenditures. ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents (Patent) filed 
(and eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
non-self citations (Citation) received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. ER is the 
employee relations score constructed based on the KLD database. BC is a dummy for whether the firm is in the 
most recent list of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. 
Lev is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided 
by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence is the number of 
independent directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences between the means 
(medians) for firms with high and low employee relations scores. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Employee relations score 
 
High ER (>0): A 
(N=2,845)  
Low ER (=0): B  
(N=6,066)  
Test of difference 
(A-B) 
Variable Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
ln(1+R&D) 3.230 3.610 
 
1.794 0.000 
 
1.436*** 3.610*** 
ln(1+Patent) 0.697 0.000 
 
0.249 0.000 
 
0.448*** 0.000*** 
ln(1+Citation) 1.109 0.000 
 
0.461 0.000 
 
0.648*** 0.000*** 
Patent 4.442 0.000 
 
0.851 0.000 
 
3.591*** 0.000*** 
Citation 30.795 0.000 
 
5.800 0.000 
 
24.995*** 0.000*** 
ER 1.408 1.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
1.408*** 1.000*** 
BC 0.124 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.124*** 0.000*** 
ln(MV) 8.640 8.598 
 
7.576 7.484 
 
1.064*** 1.114*** 
MV (million $) 18,044 5,420 
 
5,300 1,780 
 
12,745*** 3,640*** 
Q 2.184 1.675 
 
1.901 1.552 
 
0.282*** 0.123*** 
Lev 0.223 0.216 
 
0.219 0.220 
 
0.004 -0.004 
PPE/TA 0.330 0.276 
 
0.285 0.221 
 
0.045*** 0.055*** 
ROA 0.156 0.147 
 
0.144 0.136 
 
0.012*** 0.012*** 
Board independence 0.739 0.769 
 
0.711 0.733 
 
0.028*** 0.036*** 
E index 2.764 3.000   2.786 3.000   -0.022 0.000 
R&D/TA 0.038 0.013  0.024 0.000  0.014*** 0.013*** 
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Panel B: The Best Companies list 
 
BC=1: A 
(N=353)  
BC=0: B 
(N=8,558)  
Test of difference 
(A-B) 
Variable Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
ln(1+R&D) 4.129 5.186 
 
2.175 0.788 
 
1.954*** 4.397*** 
ln(1+Patent) 1.168 0.140 
 
0.360 0.000 
 
0.807*** 0.140*** 
ln(1+Citation) 1.848 0.000 
 
0.619 0.000 
 
1.229*** 0.000*** 
Patent 9.850 0.151 
 
1.674 0.000 
 
8.177*** 0.151*** 
Citation 78.839 0.000 
 
11.097 0.000 
 
67.742*** 0.000*** 
ER 1.734 2.000 
 
0.397 0.000 
 
1.337*** 2.000*** 
BC 1.000 1.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
1.000*** 1.000*** 
ln(MV) 9.425 9.503 
 
7.853 7.733 
 
1.571*** 1.770*** 
MV (million $) 35,572 13,400 
 
8,288 2,282 
 
27,284*** 11,118*** 
Q 3.182 2.806 
 
1.942 1.564 
 
1.240*** 1.242*** 
Lev 0.148 0.136 
 
0.223 0.224 
 
-0.076*** -0.088*** 
PPE/TA 0.255 0.192 
 
0.301 0.238 
 
-0.046*** -0.045*** 
ROA 0.195 0.187 
 
0.146 0.138 
 
0.049*** 0.050*** 
Board independence 0.712 0.727 
 
0.720 0.750 
 
-0.008 -0.023 
E index 2.334 2.000 
 
2.797 3.000 
 
-0.463*** -1.000*** 
R&D/TA 0.056 0.038 0.027 0.000 0.029*** 0.038*** 
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Table 3  
Workplace quality and innovation 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of firm innovation on workplace quality. Dependent variables include: ln(1+R&D) is the natural logarithm of one 
plus a firm’s R&D expenditures. ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given 
year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a 
given year. Independent variables include: ER is the employee relations score constructed based on the KLD database. BC is a dummy for whether the firm is 
in the most recent list of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q is market value of 
equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. 
PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
assets. Board independence is the number of independent directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. All regressions include industry and year effects unless otherwise 
specified. Industry effects are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We present results based on standard errors clustered by firm for all OLS 
specifications. The standard errors for Fama-MacBeth regressions are computed using the Newey-West adjustment for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Panel A. Workplace quality and R&D expenditures 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+R&D) 
 
OLS OLS Fama MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator OLS OLS 
Fama 
MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ER 0.747*** 0.395*** 0.376*** 0.465***     
 
(0.067) (0.056) (0.034) (0.068) 
    BC     1.690*** 0.695*** 0.645*** 0.861*** 
     
(0.268) (0.200) (0.091) (0.311) 
ln(MV)  0.528*** 0.550*** 0.528***  0.585*** 0.600*** 0.586*** 
  
(0.037) (0.025) (0.032) 
 
(0.037) (0.022) (0.031) 
Q  0.109*** 0.095** 0.232***  0.090** 0.080** 0.227*** 
  
(0.039) (0.033) (0.051) 
 
(0.039) (0.032) (0.052) 
Lev  -0.223 -0.448** -0.571**  -0.276 -0.496*** -0.615** 
  
(0.251) (0.201) (0.272) 
 
(0.256) (0.194) (0.276) 
PPE/TA  -1.355*** -1.356*** -1.139***  -1.214*** -1.177*** -0.999*** 
  
(0.288) (0.135) (0.274) 
 
(0.298) (0.147) (0.277) 
ROA  -3.020*** -2.352** -5.051***  -3.096*** -2.517** -5.242*** 
  
(0.503) (0.961) (0.645) 
 
(0.513) (0.968) (0.653) 
Board independence  1.192*** 1.213*** 1.394***  1.251*** 1.247*** 1.442*** 
  
(0.218) (0.077) (0.293) 
 
(0.221) (0.087) (0.297) 
E index  -0.044 -0.059** -0.055  -0.044 -0.058** -0.053 
  
(0.028) (0.022) (0.034) 
 
(0.029) (0.020) (0.034) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
N 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.686 0.711 0.652 0.559 0.677 0.704 0.642 
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Panel B. Workplace quality and patent counts 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Patent) 
 
OLS OLS Fama MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator OLS OLS 
Fama 
MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ER 0.237*** 0.091*** 0.113*** 0.180***     
 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) 
    BC     0.726*** 0.377*** 0.282** 0.482*** 
     
(0.133) (0.098) (0.094) (0.100) 
ln(MV)  0.190*** 0.247*** 0.187***  0.197*** 0.258*** 0.207*** 
  
(0.014) (0.066) (0.010) 
 
(0.013) (0.066) (0.010) 
Q  -0.008 -0.081*** -0.040**  -0.018 -0.091*** -0.050*** 
  
(0.018) (0.023) (0.018) 
 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) 
Lev  0.064 0.130 0.105  0.068 0.125 0.104 
  
(0.095) (0.076) (0.088) 
 
(0.096) (0.076) (0.090) 
PPE/TA  0.192 -0.040 0.207**  0.228* 0.020 0.263*** 
  
(0.128) (0.100) (0.088) 
 
(0.130) (0.092) (0.089) 
ROA  -0.429** 0.230 -0.042  -0.430** 0.197 -0.045 
  
(0.172) (0.239) (0.224) 
 
(0.173) (0.235) (0.227) 
Board independence  0.478*** 0.358*** 0.261***  0.484*** 0.354*** 0.274*** 
  
(0.104) (0.098) (0.094) 
 
(0.103) (0.097) (0.096) 
E index  -0.057*** -0.031*** -0.057***  -0.057*** -0.031*** -0.056*** 
  
(0.015) (0.007) (0.011) 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.011) 
R&D/TA  2.182*** 3.826** 1.969***  2.269*** 3.969** 2.244*** 
  
(0.380) (1.345) (0.356) 
 
(0.377) (1.360) (0.359) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
N 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.475 0.551 0.448 0.356 0.477 0.545 0.432 
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Panel C. Workplace quality and patent citations 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Citation) 
 
OLS OLS Fama MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator OLS OLS 
Fama 
MacBeth 
Between 
Estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ER 0.307*** 0.094** 0.129*** 0.264***     
 
(0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) 
    BC     1.010*** 0.478*** 0.310** 0.630*** 
     
(0.176) (0.129) (0.118) (0.172) 
ln(MV)  0.260*** 0.341*** 0.298***  0.266*** 0.353*** 0.329*** 
  
(0.019) (0.106) (0.018) 
 
(0.018) (0.106) (0.017) 
Q  0.035 -0.098** -0.034  0.024 -0.108*** -0.048 
  
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.031) 
Lev  -0.069 -0.004 0.158  -0.059 -0.007 0.153 
  
(0.145) (0.103) (0.151) 
 
(0.146) (0.104) (0.153) 
PPE/TA  0.370** -0.059 0.516***  0.408** 0.012 0.597*** 
  
(0.186) (0.163) (0.151) 
 
(0.188) (0.150) (0.153) 
ROA  -1.047*** 0.034 -0.399  -1.051*** -0.001 -0.403 
  
(0.301) (0.393) (0.384) 
 
(0.301) (0.393) (0.389) 
Board independence  0.695*** 0.525** 0.181  0.699*** 0.522*** 0.202 
  
(0.162) (0.177) (0.162) 
 
(0.162) (0.173) (0.164) 
E index  -0.078*** -0.031** -0.095***  -0.078*** -0.032** -0.093*** 
  
(0.021) (0.011) (0.019) 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.019) 
R&D/TA  4.087*** 7.084** 3.921***  4.142*** 7.268** 4.338*** 
  
(0.600) (2.478) (0.611) 
 
(0.597) (2.510) (0.615) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
N 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911 
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.503 0.549 0.428 0.415 0.504 0.543 0.414 
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Table 4 
Workplace quality and innovation: Instrumental variables 
 
This table presents estimates of the instrumental variables method using two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regressions. Columns (1) and (3) present the first-stage regression results in which the dependent variable is the 
employee relations score ER. The instrumental variables are: IC is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is 
headquartered in a state that has the implied-contract exception, and zero otherwise. ln(UI benefits) is the natural 
logarithm of state-level unemployment insurance benefits. Columns (2), (4), and (5) report the second-stage 
regression results. The dependent variables are: ln(1+R&D) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D 
expenditures. ln(1+Patent) is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in a given year. ln(1+Citation) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-
self citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in a given year. All other control 
variables are the same as those in the baseline models. Industry and year effects are included. Industry effects 
are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
ER ln(1+R&D) 
 
ER ln(1+Patent) ln(1+Citation) 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
IC 0.151***  
 
0.135***   
 
(0.039) 
  
(0.039) 
  ln(UI benefits) 0.074*  
 
0.070*   
 
(0.040) 
  
(0.040) 
  ER  2.326*** 
 
 0.384** 0.332 
  
(0.764) 
  
(0.186) (0.348) 
ln(MV) 0.188*** 0.162 
 
0.190*** 0.134*** 0.214*** 
 
(0.017) (0.150) 
 
(0.017) (0.046) (0.068) 
Q -0.022 0.140*** 
 
-0.054*** 0.009 0.047 
 
(0.016) (0.047) 
 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.038) 
Lev -0.189* 0.221 
 
-0.143 0.091 -0.057 
 
(0.106) (0.331) 
 
(0.106) (0.096) (0.147) 
PPE/TA 0.332*** -1.924*** 
 
0.352*** 0.088 0.271 
 
(0.112) (0.418) 
 
(0.111) (0.153) (0.226) 
ROA -0.120 -2.388*** 
 
0.181 -0.434*** -0.901*** 
 
(0.190) (0.558) 
 
(0.198) (0.157) (0.275) 
Board independence 0.179* 0.837*** 
 
0.150 0.434*** 0.666*** 
 
(0.106) (0.323) 
 
(0.105) (0.117) (0.179) 
E index 0.001 -0.040 
 
0.001 -0.056*** -0.078*** 
 
(0.013) (0.036) 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021) 
R&D/TA   
 
1.971*** 0.944 2.472*** 
    
(0.368) (0.589) (0.921) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,868 8,868 
 
8,868 8,868 8,868 
F-statistics 8.890***  
 
7.050***   
CD Wald F-statistics 36.260***  
 
28.270***   
Hansen’s J test p-value   0.363     0.254 0.153 
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Table 5 
Cross-industry comparison of the workplace quality effect 
 
In this table, we estimate the patent and citation regressions separately for three industry categories. The 
‘Pharmaceutical drugs and chemicals’ category includes industries that mainly produce patents on 
pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, healthcare, and chemicals. The ‘Computers, electrical, and 
software’ category includes industries that mainly produce patents on computers, communication technologies, 
electrical and business equipment, software programing, and internet applications. The ‘Low-tech’ category 
includes industries that produce other miscellaneous patents. The dependent variable is the number of patents, 
ln(1+Patent), for Panel A and the number of citations, ln(1+Citation), for Panel B. The main variable of interest 
is ER, the employee relations score constructed based on the KLD database. For simplicity, only the coefficient 
on the main variable of interest is reported for each regression. Other firm characteristics are controlled for. All 
OLS regression models include industry and year effects while Fama-MacBeth and between estimator 
specifications include industry effects. Industry dummies are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We 
present results based on standard errors clustered by firm for all OLS specifications. The standard errors for 
Fama-MacBeth regressions are computed using the Newey-West adjustment for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Pharmaceutical  
drugs and chemicals 
(N=1,199) 
Computers, electrical, 
and software 
(N=2,236) 
Low-tech 
(N=5,476) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = ln(1+Patent) 
OLS 0.108** 0.074* 0.038 
 
(0.045) (0.039) (0.025) 
Fama-MacBeth 0.167*** 0.140*** 0.042* 
 
(0.055) (0.039) (0.022) 
Between Estimator 0.245*** 0.192*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.073) (0.049) (0.027) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = ln(1+Citations) 
OLS 0.142** 0.056* 0.034 
 
(0.065) (0.041) (0.038) 
Fama-MacBeth 0.213** 0.158*** 0.036 
 
(0.085) (0.058) (0.032) 
Between Estimator 0.417*** 0.368*** 0.138*** 
  (0.119) (0.086) (0.046) 
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Table 6  
Workplace quality and the change in R&D expenditures during the recent recession  
 
This table presents OLS regressions results of the change in R&D expenditures from 2007-2009, denoted as 
∆Ln(1+R&D), on the severity of house price collapse in firms with high and low employee relations scores. 
Independent variables include: House price shock is the percentage drop in the Zillow Home Value Index 
(ZHVI) from December 2006 until December 2009 in the company’s state. ER is the employee relations score 
constructed based on the KLD database. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q is market 
value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum of short-
term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is 
R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence is the number of independent directors divided 
by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). All independent variables 
are measured in 2007. Industry effects are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We present results based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable = ∆Ln(1+R&D) 
  
High ER (>0) 
 (1) 
Low ER (=0) 
(2) 
House price shock × ER  
(3) 
House price shock 0.086 -0.079** -0.069* 
 
(0.065) (0.039) (0.036) 
ER   -0.016 
   
(0.010) 
House price shock × ER   0.073** 
   
(0.035) 
ln(MV) 0.005 0.003 0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Q 0.063*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.009) 
Lev 0.054 0.022 0.025 
 
(0.088) (0.058) (0.044) 
PPE/TA -0.115 -0.128** -0.130*** 
 
(0.113) (0.055) (0.048) 
ROA -0.550*** -0.082 -0.192* 
 
(0.186) (0.166) (0.114) 
Board independence -0.215 -0.095 -0.112** 
 
(0.139) (0.065) (0.056) 
E index 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.005) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 225 449 674 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.069 0.093 
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Table 7 
Organization capital and the workplace quality effect  
 
This table presents OLS regressions results of patents and citations on workplace quality in groups of firms in 
which levels of organization capital are above and below the sample median. The dependent variables are the 
number of patents, ln(1+Patent), and the number of citations, ln(1+Citation), respectively. Independent 
variables include: OC is a firm’s stock of organization capital, estimated as the capitalized SG&A expenditures 
using the perpetual inventory method, scaled by total assets. ER is the employee relations score constructed 
based on the KLD database. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q is market value of equity 
plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum of short-term and long-
term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D 
expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence is the number of independent directors divided by 
board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). All independent variables are 
lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry 
effects are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We present results based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Patent) 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Citation) 
 
High OC Low OC OC × ER 
 
High OC Low OC OC × ER 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
ER 0.084** 0.103*** 0.080** 
 
0.089* 0.110** 0.067* 
 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.033) 
 
(0.052) (0.047) (0.039) 
OC × ER   0.010 
 
  0.030 
   
(0.023) 
   
(0.036) 
OC 0.049* 0.294** 0.077*** 
 
0.066* 0.458** 0.101*** 
 
(0.025) (0.118) (0.020) 
 
(0.038) (0.178) (0.031) 
ln(MV) 0.235*** 0.175*** 0.202*** 
 
0.317*** 0.244*** 0.276*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.014) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.020) 
Q -0.024 -0.013 -0.011 
 
0.004 0.041 0.031 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.019) 
 
(0.040) (0.048) (0.032) 
Lev -0.045 0.234* 0.071 
 
-0.234 0.250 -0.063 
 
(0.140) (0.135) (0.098) 
 
(0.212) (0.207) (0.150) 
PPE/TA 0.381* 0.237 0.209 
 
0.666** 0.436* 0.378** 
 
(0.201) (0.184) (0.132) 
 
(0.310) (0.256) (0.190) 
ROA -0.664** -0.579*** -0.522*** 
 
-1.440*** -1.107*** -1.177*** 
 
(0.264) (0.213) (0.175) 
 
(0.456) (0.379) (0.306) 
Board independence 0.349** 0.534*** 0.475*** 
 
0.544** 0.747*** 0.697*** 
 
(0.144) (0.146) (0.108) 
 
(0.216) (0.236) (0.168) 
E index -0.053*** -0.070*** -0.057*** 
 
-0.074** -0.092*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.021) 
R&D/TA 1.309*** 3.154*** 1.916*** 
 
2.656*** 6.152*** 3.697*** 
 
(0.439) (0.764) (0.390) 
 
(0.672) (1.296) (0.612) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,260 4,273 8,533 
 
4,260 4,273 8,533 
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.453 0.479 
 
0.550 0.476 0.506 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Industry labor mobility and the workplace quality effect  
 
This table presents OLS regressions results for groups of firms in industries in which levels of labor mobility are 
above and below the sample median. The dependent variables are the number of patents, ln(1+Patent), and the 
number of citations, ln(1+Citation), respectively. Independent variables include: LM is the measure of labor 
mobility following Donangelo (2014). ER is the employee relations score constructed based on the KLD 
database. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q is market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided 
by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by 
total assets. Board independence is the number of independent directors divided by board size. E index is the 
entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). All independent variables are lagged one year relative 
to the dependent variable. All regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed 
based on two-digit SIC codes. We present results based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Patent)  Dependent Variable = ln(1+Citation) 
 
High LM Low LM LM × ER 
 
High LM Low LM LM × ER 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
ER 0.110*** 0.077*** 0.088*** 
 
0.103** 0.088** 0.090** 
 
(0.036) (0.025) (0.024) 
 
(0.052) (0.043) (0.038) 
LM × ER   0.042 
 
  0.048 
   
(0.026) 
   
(0.039) 
LM 0.065 -0.234*** -0.065*** 
 
0.141** -0.444*** -0.095** 
 
(0.041) (0.052) (0.025) 
 
(0.061) (0.087) (0.037) 
ln(MV) 0.232*** 0.147*** 0.191*** 
 
0.318*** 0.210*** 0.265*** 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.019) 
Q -0.014 0.011 0.004 
 
0.007 0.077* 0.053 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) 
 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.033) 
Lev 0.051 0.008 0.076 
 
-0.175 -0.104 -0.062 
 
(0.135) (0.108) (0.096) 
 
(0.195) (0.194) (0.149) 
PPE/TA 0.322* 0.138 0.202 
 
0.514** 0.294 0.374* 
 
(0.172) (0.185) (0.137) 
 
(0.252) (0.269) (0.200) 
ROA -0.674*** -0.310 -0.436** 
 
-1.287*** -1.056*** -1.071*** 
 
(0.251) (0.210) (0.177) 
 
(0.427) (0.377) (0.310) 
Board independence 0.598*** 0.375*** 0.492*** 
 
0.818*** 0.583*** 0.700*** 
 
(0.150) (0.120) (0.105) 
 
(0.224) (0.198) (0.168) 
E index -0.056*** -0.040*** -0.049*** 
 
-0.071** -0.055** -0.069*** 
 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
(0.029) (0.023) (0.021) 
R&D/TA 1.600*** 3.632*** 2.107*** 
 
3.309*** 6.383*** 3.978*** 
 
(0.441) (0.727) (0.383) 
 
(0.679) (1.187) (0.610) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,982 4,011 7,993 
 
3,982 4,011 7,993 
Adjusted R2 0.520 0.488 0.486 
 
0.560 0.517 0.511 
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Table 9  
Executive turnover and workplace quality 
This table presents estimates of probit regressions of executive turnover on the employee relations score and 
firm performance. The measures of performance are return on assets (ROA), industry-adjusted return on assets 
(Industry-adjusted ROA), Stock return, and stock return minus the value-weighted stock market return 
(Abnormal stock return) over the past year. Other controls are included: ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. Q is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by 
total assets. Lev is the sum of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization divided by total assets. R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence 
is the number of independent directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009). All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. All 
regressions include industry and year effects. Industry effects are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We 
present results based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ER 0.040 0.018 0.008 0.011 
 
(0.044) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
ROA -0.271    
 
(0.350) 
   Industry-adjusted ROA  -0.056   
  
(0.366) 
  Stock return   -0.155**  
   
(0.063) 
 Abnormal stock return    -0.173** 
    
(0.068) 
ER × ROA -0.157    
 
(0.265) 
   ER × Industry-adjusted ROA  -0.189   
  
(0.291) 
  ER × Stock return   0.052  
   
(0.063) 
 ER × Abnormal stock return    0.025 
    
(0.078) 
ln(MV) 0.027** 0.026** 0.028** 0.028** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Q -0.024 -0.032 -0.026 -0.024 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
Lev -0.036 -0.029 -0.023 -0.024 
 
(0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) 
PPE/TA 0.180 0.160 0.147 0.148 
 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.116) (0.116) 
Board independence 0.284** 0.280** 0.279** 0.279** 
 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131) 
E index 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
R&D/TA -0.228 -0.132 -0.172 -0.182 
 
(0.472) (0.473) (0.476) (0.476) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,863 8,863 8,860 8,860 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.019 
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Table 10 
Workplace quality and innovation: 
Controlling for CEO delta and vega 
 
This table presents estimates of OLS regressions of the number of patents and citations on workplace quality, 
controlling for CEO delta and vega. The dependent variables are the number of patents, ln(1+patent), and the 
number of citations, ln(1+citation), respectively. Independent variables include: ER is the employee relations 
score constructed based on the KLD database. BC is a dummy for whether the firm is in the most recent list of 
the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q 
is market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum 
of short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided 
by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. 
R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence is the number of independent 
directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). ln 
(1+CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus CEO delta, where CEO delta is defined as dollar change in 
wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (in $000s). ln (1+CEO vega) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus CEO vega, where CEO vega is defined as dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 
change in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns (in $000s). All independent variables are lagged one year 
relative to the dependent variable unless otherwise specified. All regressions include industry and year effects. 
Industry effects are constructed based on two-digit SIC codes. We present results based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(1+Patent)  Dependent Variable = ln(1+Citation) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ER 0.079***  0.080**  
 (0.024)  (0.037)  
BC  0.420***  0.527*** 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.147) 
ln(MV) 0.208*** 0.216*** 0.275*** 0.280*** 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024) 
Q -0.006 -0.015 0.036 0.025 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.032) 
Lev 0.060 0.064 -0.050 -0.042 
 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.146) (0.146) 
PPE/TA 0.219 0.249* 0.401** 0.432** 
 
(0.138) (0.141) (0.202) (0.205) 
ROA -0.421** -0.417** -1.014*** -1.013*** 
 
(0.182) (0.181) (0.316) (0.313) 
Board independence 0.513*** 0.509*** 0.772*** 0.764*** 
 
(0.109) (0.108) (0.169) (0.168) 
E index -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) 
R&D/TA 2.338*** 2.396*** 4.247*** 4.270*** 
 
(0.409) (0.402) (0.642) (0.633) 
ln (1+CEO delta) -0.019 -0.025* -0.006 -0.013 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) 
ln (1+CEO vega) -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.020) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,712 7,712 7,712 7,712 
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.485 0.508 0.511 
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Appendix A. Variable definition 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
 
 ln(1+R&D) Natural logarithm of one plus the amount of research and development 
(R&D) expenditure (in millions), measured at the end of the fiscal year t. 
Compustat 
ln(1+Patent) Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of patents filed by firm i (and 
eventually granted) measured at the end of the fiscal year t. 
NBER Patent Database  
ln(1+Citation) Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of non-self citations received 
on firm i's patents filed (and eventually granted) measured at the end of the 
fiscal year t. 
NBER Patent Database 
Patent Total number of patents filed by firm i (and eventually granted) measured at 
the end of the fiscal year t. 
NBER Patent Database 
Citation Total number of non-self citations received on firm i's patents filed (and 
eventually granted) measured at the end of the fiscal year t. 
NBER Patent Database 
Workplace quality   
ER Employee relations score, measured as the (net) sums of the strength and 
concern scores of the KLD employee relations dimension.  
KLD 
BC Best company dummy equals one if a firm is included in the most recent list 
of the "100 Best Companies to Work For in America", and zero otherwise. 
Great Place to Work 
Firm controls   
ln(MV) Natural logarithm of total market capitalization. Compustat 
Q Tobin's q, computed as market value of equity plus total assets minus the 
book value of equity, all divided by total assets, where market value of 
equity is the product of fiscal year-end closing price and number of shares 
outstanding. 
Compustat 
Lev Leverage, computed as ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debts to 
total book value of assets. 
Compustat 
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PPE/TA Asset tangibility, computed as the ratio of property, plant and equipment to 
total book value of assets. 
Compustat 
ROA Return on assets, computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization divided by total assets. 
Compustat 
R&D/TA R&D intensity, computed as the R&D expenditure to total book value of 
assets. 
Compustat 
Board independence The number of independent directors divided by the board size. IRRC 
E index Entrenchment index based on six antitakeover provisions: staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, 
and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The 
index measures the number of antitakeover provisions in place. 
RiskMetrics; 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST  
Section 4.2 
This table presents the results of the robustness checks discussed in Section 4.2. Dependent variables are Ln(1+R&D), Ln(1+Patent), and Ln(1+Citation) respectively, except 
for Poisson regressions where the dependent variables are the number of patents and citations. For brevity, only the coefficient estimates on the workplace quality indicators, 
ER and BC, are reported. Except where explicitly stated otherwise, all regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 3. Industry effects based on two-digit SIC codes 
and year effects are included unless otherwise stated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level unless otherwise stated. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 ER 
 
BC 
 
Ln(1+R&D) Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+R&D) Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) 
Alternative econometric methods 
      (1) Use Tobit regression 0.516*** 0.138*** 0.144*** 
 
0.318 0.347*** 0.254*** 
 
(0.087) (0.011) (0.019) 
 
(0.226) (0.020) (0.035) 
(2) Use Poisson regression  0.107* 0.122* 
 
 0.166 0.157 
     (dependent variables are patent and citation counts)  
 
(0.064) (0.067) 
  
(0 .132) (0.139) 
 
Robustness checks using OLS regressions       
(3) Exclude 2009 and 2010 from sample 0.381*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 
0.763*** 0.403*** 0.496*** 
 
(0.062) (0.031) (0.046) 
 
(0.189) (0.107) (0.140) 
(4) Use the net employee relations score 0.244*** 0.036** 0.032* 
 
   
 
(0.036) (0.016) (0.018) 
    (5) Control for additional CEO and board characteristics 
     (including Holder 67, Fraction of female directors, CEO age, CEO         
tenure, CEO gender, Board tenure diversity, Board age diversity) 
 
0.396***  
(0.058) 
0.089*** 
(0.024) 
0.103*** 
(0.037)  
0.622*** 
(0.202) 
0.381*** 
(0.106) 
0.510*** 
(0.142) 
(6) Replace firm-level controls with Industry-average controls 0.746*** 0.233*** 0.297*** 
 
1.679*** 0.709*** 0.970*** 
 
(0.067) (0.029) (0.040) 
 
(0.268) (0.131) (0.171) 
(7) Regress innovation on the workplace quality indicator and 0.397*** 0.084*** 0.081** 
 
0.672*** 0.346*** 0.407*** 
      industry-year effects (2-digit SIC) 
 
(0.058) (0.024) (0.035) (0.210) (0.097) (0.120) 
50 
 
(8) Use industry effects based on the Fama-French 49 classification 0.353*** 0.075*** 0.070* 
 
0.584*** 0.357*** 0.448*** 
 
(0.053) (0.023) (0.036) 
 
(0.161) (0.095) (0.128) 
(9) Use industry effects based on the 3-digit NAICS classification 0.382*** 0.099*** 0.112*** 
 
0.567*** 0.370*** 0.483*** 
 
(0.053) (0.025) (0.037) 
 
(0.170) (0.097) (0.130) 
(10) Exclude year effects 0.405*** 0.096*** 0.124*** 
 
0.720*** 0.421*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.055) (0.025) (0.040) 
 
(0.198) (0.099) (0.136) 
(11) Cluster by year 0.395*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 
 
0.695*** 0.377*** 0.478*** 
 
(0.019) (0.026) (0.028) 
 
(0.076) (0.061) (0.080) 
(12) Cluster by 2-digit SIC industries 0.395*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 
 
0.695** 0.377*** 0.478*** 
 
(0.086) (0.024) (0.035) 
 
(0.269) (0.092) (0.123) 
(13) Cluster by firm and year 0.395*** 0.091*** 0.094** 
 
0.695*** 0.377*** 0.478*** 
 
(0.054) (0.034) (0.044) 
 
(0.193) (0.102) (0.130) 
(14) Cluster by 2-digit SIC industries and year 0.395*** 0.091** 0.094** 
 
0.695*** 0.377*** 0.478*** 
 
(0.091) (0.035) (0.047) 
 
(0.260) (0.101) (0.135) 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST  
Section 4.3 
 
This table reports the tests results discussed in Section 4.3 for whether missing values on the employee relations score affect our findings. Panel A compares the industry 
distribution of the deleted sample due to missing information on the employee relations score with those of the initial and final samples. Panel B presents the multiple 
imputation results. Industry and year effects are included. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sample distributions across Fama and French 12 industries 
        
 
Initial sample 
 
Deleted sample due to  
missing values on ER 
 
Final sample 
 
Obs. Percent 
 
Obs. Percent 
 
Obs. Percent 
Consumer NonDurables  884 7.0% 
 
245 6.6% 
 
639 7.2% 
Consumer Durables  398 3.2% 
 
132 3.5% 
 
266 3.0% 
Manufacturing 2,101 16.6% 
 
651 17.4% 
 
1,450 16.3% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 623 4.9% 
 
211 5.6% 
 
412 4.6% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 550 4.4% 
 
125 3.3% 
 
425 4.8% 
Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 2,386 18.9% 
 
710 19.0% 
 
1,676 18.8% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 223 1.8% 
 
86 2.3% 
 
137 1.5% 
Utilities 925 7.3% 
 
275 7.4% 
 
650 7.3% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 1,927 15.2% 
 
558 14.9% 
 
1,369 15.4% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 1,064 8.4% 
 
290 7.8% 
 
774 8.7% 
Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 1,567 12.4% 
 
454 12.1% 
 
1,113 12.5% 
Total 12648 100.0% 
 
3737 100.0% 
 
8,911 100.0% 
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Panel B: Multiple imputation 
  
Number of imputation = 5  
 
Number of imputation = 10  
Dependent Variables 
 
Ln(1+R&D) Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+R&D) Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) 
  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
ER 
 
0.308*** 0.065*** 0.064** 
 
0.324*** 0.079*** 0.086*** 
  
(0.044) (0.018) (0.029) 
 
(0.046) (0.018) (0.031) 
Ln(MV) 
 
0.520*** 0.206*** 0.312*** 
 
0.517*** 0.203*** 0.308*** 
  
(0.031) (0.012) (0.017) 
 
(0.031) (0.012) (0.017) 
Q 
 
0.066** -0.025* -0.001 
 
0.067** -0.024* 0.000 
  
(0.030) (0.013) (0.023) 
 
(0.030) (0.013) (0.023) 
Lev 
 
-0.214 0.050 -0.071 
 
-0.224 0.049 -0.072 
  
(0.196) (0.069) (0.115) 
 
(0.196) (0.069) (0.115) 
PPE/TA 
 
-1.243*** 0.064 0.165 
 
-1.254*** 0.058 0.156 
  
(0.233) (0.091) (0.142) 
 
(0.233) (0.091) (0.142) 
ROA 
 
-2.667*** -0.185 -0.521** 
 
-2.670*** -0.187 -0.524** 
  
(0.360) (0.117) (0.221) 
 
(0.351) (0.116) (0.220) 
Board independence 
 
1.059*** 0.413*** 0.671*** 
 
1.064*** 0.414*** 0.670*** 
  
(0.169) (0.072) (0.120) 
 
(0.169) (0.072) (0.120) 
E index 
 
-0.035 -0.033*** -0.044*** 
 
-0.036 -0.033*** -0.044*** 
  
(0.024) (0.011) (0.017) 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.017) 
R&D/TA 
 
 1.866*** 4.651*** 
 
 1.837*** 4.606*** 
   
(0.283) (0.521) 
  
(0.281) (0.519) 
       
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 
 
12,648 12,648 12,648 
 
12,648 12,648 12,648 
Average adjusted R2   0.661 0.442 0.464   0.662 0.443 0.464 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST  
Section 4.3. Heckman two-step analysis of firm innovation 
 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors obtained from a Heckman two-step analysis of firm 
innovation, as measured by R&D expenditures, patent and citation counts. In the first stage, we estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable, ER availability, is one if the data on the employee relations score are non-
missing and zero otherwise. The independent variables include Post KLD coverage expansion, in addition to 
other firm characteristics. Post KLD coverage expansion is a dummy equals one for the period after KLD 
expanding its coverage in 2003, and zero otherwise. In the second stage, we examine the impact of a firm’s 
employee relations score on its innovation. The inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) derived from the first stage 
selection model is included in the second stage as a regressor. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Second stage: firm innovation is the dependent variable 
 
Ln(1+R&D) 
 
Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) 
 4   2 3 
ER 0.388*** 
 
0.073*** 0.069* 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.024) (0.039) 
Ln(MV) 0.547*** 
 
0.233*** 0.372*** 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.014) (0.021) 
Q 0.095** 
 
0.017 0.076** 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.019) (0.035) 
Lev -0.198 
 
0.228** 0.293* 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.095) (0.155) 
PPE/TA -1.332*** 
 
0.407*** 0.821*** 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.130) (0.197) 
ROA -2.823*** 
 
-0.457*** -1.032*** 
 
(0.470) 
 
(0.170) (0.315) 
Board independence 1.209*** 
 
0.124 0.071 
 
(0.210) 
 
(0.100) (0.163) 
E index -0.043* 
 
-0.085*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.015) (0.021) 
R&D/TA  
 
2.028*** 3.846*** 
   
(0.370) (0.634) 
Lambda 0.274*** 
 
0.370*** 0.960*** 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.031) (0.066) 
Industry FE Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 8911 8911 8911 
Adjusted R2 0.685  0.395 0.385 
     
First-stage: probit model of firms with non-missing employee relations scores 
 ER availability  ER availability 
Post KLD coverage 
expansion 2.355***  2.356*** 
 (0.072)  (0.073) 
All controls Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
N 12,605 
 
12,605 
Pseudo R2 0.527 
 
0.527 
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ROBUSTNESS TEST  
Section 4.4. Propensity score matching 
 
This table presents estimates of difference in the number of patents, ln(1+Patent), and number of citations, 
ln(1+Citation) between the treatment and control groups based on the employee relations score and the Best 
Companies list. The matched sample is constructed using a nearest-neighbour propensity score match with 
scores given by probit models in Panel A. The dependent variables are the ER dummy, a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a firm has an employee relations score above the sample median; and BC, a dummy 
variable for whether the firm is in the most recent list of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. 
Independent variables in the probit models include: ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Q is 
market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. Lev is the sum of 
short-term and long-term debts divided by total assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by 
total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. 
R&D/TA is R&D expenditures divided by total assets. Board independence is the number of independent 
directors divided by board size. E index is the entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probit regressions  
 
ER dummy 
(1) 
BC 
(2) 
ln(MV) 0.553*** 0.755*** 
 
(0.048) (0.108) 
Q -0.077 0.033 
 
(0.059) (0.092) 
Lev -0.347 -1.409 
 
(0.398) (1.094) 
PPE/TA 1.348*** -0.803 
 
(0.413) (1.123) 
ROA 0.206 2.252 
 
(0.763) (1.658) 
Board independence 0.737* 0.788 
 
(0.384) (0.791) 
E index 0.032 0.041 
 
(0.046) (0.114) 
R&D/TA 8.265*** 9.393*** 
 
(1.474) (2.416) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 8,857 8,857 
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.283 
 
Panel B: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
ER dummy  BC 
ln(1+Patent) 
(1) 
ln(1+Citation) 
(2) 
 ln(1+Patent) 
(3) 
ln(1+Citation) 
(4) 
0.144*** 0.148***  0.221** 0.211** 
(5.360) (3.250)  (2.100) (1.980) 
 
 
